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THE PROBLEM OF SOCIAL COST: THE CITATIONS*
R. H. COASE**
That my article, The Problem of Social Cost, should appear at the
head of the list of the most-cited articles that have been published in
legal periodicals is at first sight quite extraordinary. It was an article
written by an economist for economists. It was no part of my intention
to contribute to legal scholarship. It was quite appropriate for my arti-
cle to have appeared in the Journal of Law and Economics (classified
as a legal periodical by Mr. Fred Shapiro) since it was my contention
in that article that the legal system plays a major role determining the
way in which the economic system functions. I knew, of course, from
the comments of colleagues, my reading of the legal literature, and in
other ways, that the article had had a very considerable effect on legal
scholarship, but I was nonetheless puzzled by Mr. Fred Shapiro's
figures that showed that the citations to this article were far and away
greater than those to any other article. I therefore asked Mr. Shapiro
to provide me with the number of citations in legal periodicals alone,
since it seemed to me possible that the overwhelming number could
perhaps be explained by the citations in economics and similar period-
icals, which would make the number of citations in the legal literature
much smaller.
Mr. Shapiro was kind enough to provide me with these figures.
They showed that the number of citations in legal periodicals was 940.
A similar count (confined to legal periodicals) for the next two articles
in the list gave the following result:
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
927;
Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 879.
This revised calculation eliminated the overwhelming character of the
number of citations to my article but it still retained its place as the
most-cited article. Of course, the number of citations is a very rough
indication of the influence of an article and, in any case, there is no
point in discussing whether an article on law and economics is more or
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less influential than one on constitutional law. What can be said is that
it is most improbable that an article that has been cited so often has
not had a considerable influence on legal scholarship.
Mr. Shapiro's figures also show that the number of citations to
The Problem of Social Cost in the other (mainly economics) journals
is very great (it is 761) and some have thought that it is probably the
most-cited article in the economics literature. Whether this is true or
not, there is no doubt that it has been an extremely influential article
in the non-legal literature. Why this is so is something that I think I
can explain. My article criticized the standard analysis of what econo-
mists term "externalities." I argued that Pigou's approach (the one
adopted at the time by most mainstream economists) was faulty. This
was bound to excite interest in the article. It was also to be expected
that an article so critical of views held by many (perhaps most) econo-
mists would encounter resistance, and it did. Many of the citations in
the economics literature are in fact in articles attacking my views.
But some of my contentions were not disposed of easily. These
included: that the standard treatment of "externalities" ignored the
reciprocal nature of the problem; that what is traded on the market is
not physical entities but rights to perform certain actions; that the
analysis would not be fruitful unless it took into account transaction
costs; that the analysis should concentrate on uncovering the total ef-
fect of a change in policy rather than considering whether the adjust-
ments at the margin in the new situation would be what we would like
them to be.
It also must be said that interest in the article was increased by
the unusual circumstances that gave rise to its writing and publication.
In an article on the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC),
published in 1959, I argued that use of the radio frequency spectrum
should be determined by the pricing mechanism rather than by admin-
istrative decisions of the FCC and I went on to discuss the rights that
would be acquired by the successful purchasers. I said that although
"delimitation of rights is an essential prelude to market transactions
.. the ultimate result... is independent of the legal decision." This
statement was thought by economists at The University of Chicago to
be erroneous, as contravening Pigou's analysis. However, at a meeting
in Chicago I was able to persuade these economists that I was right.
The result was that I was invited to write up my argument for publica-
tion in the Journal of Law and Economics. I did this, entitling the
article, The Problem of Social Cost. One consequence of this rather
unusual route to publication was that when the article appeared in
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print, its thesis already had the support of a powerful group of econo-
mists at The University of Chicago. Stigler dubbed the proposition,
that the allocation of resources was independent of the legal position
if transaction costs were zero, "The Coase Theorem." This attracted
more attention to the article and, of course, increased the number of
citations.
I now turn to the writing about The Problem of Social Cost in
legal periodicals. I offer my impressions with diffidence since I am not
a lawyer and lack detailed knowledge of the legal literature. I was in
fact unaware of how lawyers had treated my article before reading a
selection of the articles in legal periodicals as preparation for these
comments. Given the great number of citations, it was obviously im-
possible for me to read all the articles in which The Problem of Social
Cost was cited. I therefore decided to confine myself to citations in the
law reviews of ten major law schools.1 All articles that cited The Prob-
lem of Social Cost in these law reviews were obtained from the Social
Sciences Citation Index for the years 1976 to 1992. There were 188
such articles. What I learned from reading these articles was in many
ways surprising to me. There were far fewer critical articles (or com-
ments) than I had expected. Most of the citations were to passages in
which the author (or authors) used ideas in my article for the purpose
of analyzing a particular legal situation or problem. It was certainly
surprising to me to find that the greatest number of citations was to
the "Coase Theorem." According to my classification (which I admit
was highly subjective), there were ninety-one articles (nearly half the
total) in which the passage to which the citation was attached was
wholly or mainly concerned with this theorem and, of course, the the-
orem was also referred to in a number of other articles. The reciprocal
character of the "externality" problem, with its implications for tort
law, was also discussed, although in far fewer articles. There were sev-
enteen articles in which this was the major concern. All in all, it was
gratifying to find that my article was mainly cited because it had been
found useful. At this stage, it would seem that the number of citations
was not misleading as an index of influence.
Of course, once these ideas in my article (to the extent that they
come to be seen as correct) become part and parcel of legal thought, it
1. The Law Schools were: Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Pennsylvania, Chicago, Berkeley,
Stanford, Virginia, Michigan, and Texas. The law reviews of these law schools were those that
were most-cited in the list of twenty-five "top" law schools in the April 29, 1991, issue of U.S.
News and World Report. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Influence of Eco-
nomics on Law: A Quantitative Study, 36 J.L. ECON. 422, tbl. 17 (1993).
19961
812 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:809
will no longer be thought necessary to cite my article. And in conse-
quence, at the stage when the influence of my article may be said to be
most profound, the study of citations will cease to reveal it.
